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Formosa ê hoat-lu̍t tē-ūi: 1950 nî The Economist bûn-chiuⁿ chi̍t phiⁿ

Hoat-piáu: 2016-05-07 iû P生
Siu-kái: 2017-08-31, Tâi-gí-hòa

Chi̍t phiⁿ thó-lūn Tâi-oân hoat-lu̍t tē-ūi ê té bûn-chiuⁿ, hoat-piáu tī 1950 nî 7 goe̍h 8 ji̍t hoat-hêng ê Eng-kok chiu-khan sin-bûn-chóa The Economist, tê-bo̍k sī "Formosa ê Hoat-lu̍t tē-ūi" (The Legal Status of Formosa). Tong-sî Bí-kok chóng-thóng Harry S. Truman tng koat-tēng hông-gū Tâi-oân, hit chām Ji̍t-pún iáu bōe chhiam-tēng hô-pêng tiâu-iok. Ē-té sī goân Eng-gí bûn-chiuⁿ kiam Tâi-gí hoan-e̍k.

Formosa ê Hoat-lu̍t Tē-ūi

Truman Chóng-thóng koat-tēng hiòng Formosa thê-kiong Bí-kok ê hái-kun pó-hō͘, lâi tùi-khòng Kiōng-sán-tóng tùi Tiong-kok pún-thó͘ ê chhim-ji̍p, pún hāng koat-tēng sī hoat-seng chū Tiâu-sián Kiōng-sán-chú-gī-chiá ê kun-sū chhim-lio̍k, che chhim-lio̍k tio̍h ì-sù kóng Kiōng-sán-chú-gī ê chiàn-lio̍k-sèng pek-hia̍p tī Tang A-chiu ê tiōng-iàu sèng-chit í-keng hông chheng-chhó khiat-sī, jî-chhiá thê-kiong liáu m̄-chí tī Tiâu-sián chò ū-hông siat-tì ê ki-chhó͘. Lēng-gōa chi̍t hong-bīn, tùi Formosa pún-sin lâi kóng, iáu bōe hoat-seng siáⁿ-mi̍h sin tāi-chì thang kái-piàn í-keng tī Bí-kok bô kan-siap ê chōng-hóng ē-té î-chhî kúi--a kò-goe̍h ê chōng-thài. Ē-tàng chai-iáⁿ ū chi̍t kóa chòe-ko kun-su kap chèng-tī pō͘-mn̂g, tùi Bí-kok pó-hō͘ Formosa ê ha̍p-î-sèng chûn-chài bô-kâng ê chi̍t kóa ì-kiàn, it-poaⁿ jīn-ûi phian hiòng pàng tāi-chì ka-tī hoat-tián ê chèng-chhek thoân-thé, í-keng pí chhiòng-tō kan-siap ê lâng kēng-ka oa̍h-hiáⁿ.

Chóng-sī, ha̍p-î-sèng ê būn-tê, tiāⁿ kap hoat-lu̍t siōng ê chèng-tong-hòa būn-tê chin ū cheng-chha, tong Lō͘-se-a kap Kiōng-sán Tiong-kok khòng-sò͘ Bí-kok sī teh "chhim-lio̍k" Tiong-kok ê sî, he āu hāng to̍h su-iàu hông kiông-tiāu. Kap Bí-kok tâu ji̍p kun-sū tōng-chok lâi kan-siap Tiong-kok pún-sin lōe-chiàn ê khó-lêng-sèng bô-kâng, chiam-tùi Formosa ê tōng-chok ê hoat-lu̍t ki-chhó͘, sī Formosa bo̍k-chêng chiàu hoat-lu̍t lâi kóng m̄-sī Tiong-kok léng-thó͘. I sī siū Tiong-kok chiàm-niá ê Ji̍t-pún léng-thó͘, í-keng tī 1895 nî ê sî koah-niū hō͘ Ji̍t-pún, jî-chhiá che ē pó-chhî kàu keng-kòe hô-pêng tiâu-iok chèng-sek têng koah-niū kòe Tiong-kok ûi chí. Khak-si̍t tī Thài-pêng-iûⁿ Chiàn-cheng kî-kan ê Cairo Hōe-gī, Eng-kok kap Bí-kok sêng-lo̍k liáu tī tit tio̍h tùi Ji̍t-pún ê sèng-lī chò chiân-tê, Formosa thang hông hêng tńg Tiong-kok, m̄-koh chit hāng î-choán tī chi̍t hūn hô-pêng tiâu-iok chìn-chêng, bē tī hoat-lu̍t-siōng si̍t-hiān. Bô lūn jû-hô, í-keng piáu-bêng "pōe-poān-chiá" Chiúⁿ Kài-sek kap gōa-kok sè-le̍k só͘ chhòng ê tiâu-iok lóng-sī khang-hi bû-hāu ê Tiong-kok Kiōng-sán-tóng, tian-tó chin pháiⁿ tī in tùi Chiúⁿ--sī ùi Cairo ê hia̍p-gī ê ha̍p-ì pó-chhî it-chè.

Tong-jiân, ū chi̍t khoán chiàu khah iân-tn̂g ê koan-tiám só͘ chò ê koat-tèng-sèng lūn-soat, sī kóng Formosa pat sio̍k Tiong-kok, jî-chhiá to-sò͘ jîn-kháu sī kóng Tiong-kok-ōe; chiàu chi̍t khoán lí-iû lâi kóng, Tiong-kok phian-hiòng kā só͘-ū chiam-tùi hiān-taⁿ ka-tōaⁿ hoat-lu̍t tē-ūi ê thó-lūn lóng khòaⁿ chò sī goân-choân teh loān-kóng. M̄-koh Formosa lâng pēng bô ka-tī chiong ka-tī tùi Ji̍t-pún ê thóng-tī ē-té kái-hòng chhut--lâi, jî-chhiá Tiong-kok ê pō͘-tūi nā bô Bí-kok ê chûn-chiah kap khong-tiong ūn-su, mā kin-pún bô hoat-tō͘ tī Ji̍t-pún tâu-hâng liáu-āu tī he tó-sū chiūⁿ-lio̍k. Truman chóng-thóng kap ê chu ūi kò͘-mn̄g, khòaⁿ bōe chhut ū siáⁿ-mi̍h kok-chè-hoat siōng ê lí-iū, thang iau-kiû in kā chi̍t tè iáu-bōe tī hoat-lu̍t-siōng chiâⁿ chò Tiong-kok chi̍t pō͘-hūn, koh sī Bí-kok-lâng tan-to̍k tùi Ji̍t-pún hia tit--lâi, jî-chhiá hoān-sè ū siong-tong ê chiàn-lio̍k tiòng-iàu-sèng ê léng-thó͘, tī Oán-tang tng tī gûi-hiám bú-chong chhiong-tu̍t ê sî-ki, niū hō͘ chi̍t-ê oa̍h-tōng tùi-te̍k ê Tiong-kok chèng-hú.

The Legal Status of Formosa

President Truman’s decision to afford American naval protection to Formosa against Communist invasion from the Chinese mainland arose out of the military aggression of the Korean Communists in the sense that that aggression sharply revealed the serious character of the Communist strategic threat in the Far East and provided ground for precautionary measures not confined to Korea. On the other hand, nothing new had happened with regard to Formosa itself to alter a situation that had endured for several months without any American intervention. It was known that differences of opinion existed in the highest military and political quarters on the expediency of American action to save Formosa, and it was, generally believed that the policy group in favour of letting events take their course had prevailed over the advocates of intervention.

The question of expediency, however, was always quite distinct from the question of legal justification, and it is the latter which needs to be stressed when Russia and Communist China charge the United States with “aggression” against China. The legal basis for action with regard to Formosa, as distinct from any military action which the United States might have taken to intervene in the civil war in China itself, is that Formosa is not at present juridically Chinese territory. It is Chinese-occupied Japanese territory, having been ceded to Japan in 1895, and so it remains until it is formally retroceded to China by a peace treaty. It is true that at the Cairo Conference during the Pacific War Britain and the United States promised that Formosa would be restored to China by the terms of a victorious peace with Japan, but the transfer is not legally accomplished until there is a peace treaty. In any case, the Chinese Communist party, having proclaimed treaties made with foreign powers by the “traitor” Chiang Kai-shek to be null and void, can hardly with consistency invoke in its own favour the agreement made with Chiang at Cairo.

It is, of course, a decisive argument on a longer view that Formosa formerly belonged to China and that the great majority of its population is Chinese-speaking; for this reason Chinese tend to regard all discussion of its present legal status as mere quibbling. But the Formosans did nothing to liberate themselves from Japanese rule, nor could Chinese troops have ever landed on the island after Japan’s surrender without being conveyed there by American shipping and air transport. President Truman and his advisers do not see any reason in international law requiring them to allow a territory of potentially considerable strategic importance, which is not yet legally a part of China and which American arms alone took from Japan, to pass under the control of an actively hostile Chinese Government in a period of dangerous armed conflict in the Far East.